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or national origin. This amendment is self-operative." 33 Section 3 of
the present constitution provides:
All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights,
and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public
84
emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.
The Supreme Court of Texas in discussing the equal rights guaranteed by Art. I, § 3, of the Texas Constitution said:
In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislative differences ....
Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it
does 88require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable.
Passing the proposed amendment would render all legislation based
wholly and arbitrarily on sex unconstitutional. 0 Any law which has as
its basis a differential based on facts other than sex would be valid, but
that sex alone is not a reasonable
the amendment is necessary to insure
87
ground for legislative purposes.
Robert S. Flaniken

IMMUNITY-HOSPITALS-A "PAYING PATIENT"
COUNTY HOSPITAL MAY NOT MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION
IN TORT IN THE EVENT OF INJURIES SUSTAINED As THE RESULT OF

GOVERNMENT
IN

A

THE NEGLIGENCE OF HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES.

Ritch v. Tarrant County

Hospital District, 476 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth),
writ ref'd n.r.e., 480 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
Tom L. Ritch, while under the influence of medications administered by the hospital staff, fell from his bed in the intensive care unit
of a county hospital and sustained injuries which subsequently resulted
in death. The plaintiffs, Ritch's surviving spouse and children, brought
action for damages under the Texas Wrongful Death Act,1 alleging
negligence of the hospital's staff and employees. The lower court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Tarrant County
88 Proposed Amendment: TEx. CONST. art. I § 3a (Supp. 1972). Proposed by S.J.R. No.
16, Acts 1971, 62nd Legislature, 4129, for submission to the people in Nov., 1972.
84 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3.
35 Friedman v. American Surety Co., 137 Tex. 149, 160, 151 S.W.2d 570, 576 (1941).
3 Tobolowsky, For Equal Rights Amendment, 26 TEX. B.J. 1004 (1963).

37 1d. Contra, Amsler, Against Equal Rights Amendment, 26 TEX. B.J. 1005 (1963).
1 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (1952).
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Hospital District, and plaintiffs appealed. Held-Affirmed. The present
status of governmental immunity in Texas inhibits recovery even in
those instances in which the claimant is a "paying patient," in spite of
the fact that the hospital functioned and operated in a purely propri2
etary capacity with reference to the injured claimant.
The immunity of the sovereign to liability is a judge-made doctrine
of law which bars recovery for tortious conduct of the agents, employees,
or officers of the state. The first instance of its application was in Russell v. Men of Devon.8 The rule of Men of Devon was adopted first in
this country in Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester4 in 1812. Chief Justice Marshall, without citation of authority, found the rule to be controlling in federal courts in 1821.5 This doctrine gradually became the
general rule of law in the United States.
In spite of this common origin, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
has followed divergent patterns in the various state jurisdictions. This
differentiation is particularly visible in the application of the rule to
the county, as a governmental unit, in its functional capacity. Some
jurisdictions hold that the county is a governmental entity which functions only in a governmental capacity. 6 The trend of the law, however,
is to recognize the fact that counties do operate in a proprietary manner
in some instances, and, as such, they should be held liable just as a
private individual or corporation. 7 A third approach to county liability
for tortious conduct recognizes the proprietary nature of certain functions of the county, but withholds liability in the absence of specific
statutory law which enables such recovery.8
The question of liability of a county hospital for the negligence of
its employees which results in injury or death to a patient remains an
issue of governmental immunity in most jurisdictions. 9 A few states
2 Ritch v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 476 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth),
writ ref'd n.r.e., 480 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
8 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
49 Mass. 247 (1812).
5 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 262, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 971 (4th ed. 1971).

GE.g., Hartness v. Allegheny County, 37 A.2d 18 (Pa. 1944); McMahon v. Baroness
Erlanger Hosp., 306 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957); Shaffer v. Monongalia Gen. Hosp.,
62 S.E.2d 795 (W. Va. 1950).
7 E.g., Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 369 P.2d 271 (Ariz. 1962); Henderson v. Twin Falls
County, 50 P.2d 597 (Idaho 1935); Wittmer v. Letts, 80 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1957); Jacoby
v. Chouteau County, 112 P.2d 1068 (Mont. 1941); Granite Oil Securities, Inc. v. Douglas
County, 219 P.2d 191 (Nev. 1950); Rhodes v. City of Ashville, 52 S.E.2d 371 (N.C. 1949);
Carlson v. Marinette County, 59 N.W.2d 486 (Wis. 1953). See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d
1080 (1951).
8E.g., Laney v. Jefferson County, 32 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 1947); Schaffer v. Board of Trustees,
168 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 1960); Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 P. 510 (Utah 1921). Contra,
Krause v. State, 274 N.E.2d 321 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971).
1 E.g., Laney v. Jefferson County, 32 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 1947); McMahon v. Baroness
Erlanger Hosp., 306 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957); Shaffer v. Monongalia Gen. Hosp.,
62 S.E.2d 795 (W. Va. 1950). See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1083 (1951).
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recognize a special status for the "paying patient" in a county hospital
and hold the county liable for negligence when it acts in such a proprietary capacity. 10
Governmental immunity in Texas is a rule of law established by the
judiciary;" the state may not be sued without its consent. 12 Furthermore, even in those instances of legislative consent to suit, the state has
been held to be immune from liability for the torts of its agents or
employees.' 8 The courts of Texas have long recognized the governmental versus proprietary dichotomy of functions for municipal corporations,' 4 and have held a city liable for the negligence of its employees when engaged in a proprietary function. The county, on the
other hand, is a governmental agency, a subagent of the state, and as
such only performs governmental functions; therefore, liability for the
tortious conduct of employees is barred by the operation of sovereign
immunity in the same manner that such rule protects the state.15
The court's decision in the instant case was rendered in strict compliance with precedent. In affirming summary judgment for defendant
hospital district, Chief Justice Massey reasoned:
Although plaintiff's decedent was a "paying patient," i.e., one
with whom the defendant had contracted, upon compensation, for
his hospital care as of the time of his alleged negligently inflicted
injuries, resulting in death, we are of the opinion that the present
state of the doctrine of governmental immunity in Texas inhibits
any recovery. 10
Under current law, its [the county hospital] governmental immunity is referable thereto and exists in consequence despite the fact
10 E.g., Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 369 P.2d 271 (Ariz. 1962); Suwannee County Hosp.
Corp. v. Golden, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952); Henderson v. Twin Falls County, 50 P.2d 597
(Idaho 1935); Wittmer v. Letts, 80 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1957). See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R.
2d 1083 (1951).
11 The rule was first applied in Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764 (1847).
12 Id.
13 Texas Hwy. Dep't v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628, 219 S.W.2d 70 (1949); State v. Hale, 136
Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731 (1941). See generally Comment, The Governmental Immunity Doctrine in Texas-An Analysis and Some Proposed Changes, 23 Sw. L.J. 341 (1969); Comment,
Governmental Immunity from Suit and Liability in Texas, 27 TEXAs L. REV. 337 (1964).
14 City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, 131 (1884).
15 Hodge v. Lower Colo. River Authority, 163 S.W.2d 855, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1942, writ dism'd by agr.).
16 Ritch v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 476 S.W.2d 950, 951 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth), writ ref'd n.r.e., 480 S.W.2d 622 (rex. Sup. 1972).
The Tarrant County Hospital District was created under provisions of Article 4494n,
V.A.T.S., and Article 9, Sec. 4, of the Constitution of the State of Texas.... It was
created as, and is, a lawfully constituted county-wide Hospital District in Tarrant
County, and owns and operates a public hospital system for the purpose of furnishing
medical aid and hospital care to indigent and needy persons residing in the Hospital
District. Obvious therefore is the character of the corporation and the purposes for
which it was created. Id. at 952.
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that, as applied to the plaintiff's decedent,
it functioned and oper7
ated in a purely proprietary capacity.'
These conclusions were based primarily on a prior decision of the
same court in Arseneau v. Tarrant County Hospital District,5 which
clearly established the application of governmental immunity to the
district's ordinary operation of its hospital. However, the court also
relied on Hodge v. Lower Colorado River Authority19 which was interpreted as indicating that "general governmental immunity from liability (except for municipalities) is referable not only to the character of
the function performed, but also to the character of the corporation
itself, and the purposes for which it was created." 20 An analysis of
Hodge does not reveal this distinction to be applicable to counties, but
is specifically related to municipal corporations. 21 Furthermore, the
counties do not function in a proprietary capacity in Texas as they are
...political subdivisions of the state operating solely and exclusively as a governmental agency in a governmental capacity and
are, therefore, immune from tort liability. .

.

. [c]ounties are ex-

ercising a governmental function when they furnish, operate and
maintain hospitals for the benefit
of the public and not for the
22
purpose of profit or revenue.
The dictates of precedent restrained the court's conclusion, but did
not inhibit Justice Massey in the expression of his distaste for the end
result:
Were the author of this opinion free to do so, he would hold
substantially as did the Supreme Court of Florida in Suwannee
County Hospital Corp. v. Golden,23"1 and say that, ". .. as to those
who are paying patients ...

the hospital is operated in a propri-

etary capacity, and they may not be divested of constitutional rights
by the attempted statutory immunization. As to persons of that
classification, the hospital is the same as if it were privately maintained, its duty to the patient
is the same, and it should be equally
' 24

responsible for its torts.

This minority view, 25 advocated by Justice Massey, accedes to the
17 Id. at 952 (emphasis added).
18 408 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19 163 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942, writ dism'd by agr.).
20 Ritch v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 476 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth), writ ref'd n.r.e., 480 S.W.2d 622 (rex. Sup. 1972).
21 Hodge v. Lower Colo. River Authority, 163 S.W.2d 855, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1942, writ dism'd by agr.).
22 Rodriquez v. Medical Arts Hosp., 437 F.2d 1203, 1204 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
23856 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952).
24 Ritch v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 476 S.W.2d 950, 951 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth), writ ref'd n.r.e., 480 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
25 Suwannee County Hosp. Corp. v. Golden, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952); accord, Hernandez

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol4/iss2/15

4

Patton: A Paying Patient in a County Hospital May Not Maintain a Cause of

1972]

CASE NOTES

logical conclusion that it is the character of the function which is the
real test of whether or not governmental immunity to tort should be
applied in any given set of circumstances. Thus, "it is not a tort for
government to govern, ' 2 but "an enterprise is not governmental in
character simply because the government enters it or the Legislature
declares it So." '2 7 "Whether it be governmental or proprietary depends
' ' 28
on the nature of the business and the determination of the courts.
The operation of the county hospital is essentially a charitable enterprise in Texas. 29 However, "paying patients" are admitted, and the
enabling statutes provide for partial payment for services rendered;
hospital charges are based on the patient's ability to pay, but not exceeding per capita costs of operation and maintenance.30 The granting
of total immunity for negligence, even if the county hospital were
absolutely "charitable" in its activities, would appear to be in direct
conflict with the court's abolishment of charitable immunity in Howle
v. Camp Amon Carter.81 Justice Greenhill's criticism of the "charitable"
status of hospitals which charged their patients for the requisite health
care would seem to apply with equal vigor to the county hospital. 32 Yet
the exercise of governmental immunity bars recovery for negligently
inflicted injuries for which private as well as charitable hospitals are
held liable-even when the claimant is a "paying patient."
Governmental immunity as a doctrine of law has been adequately
criticized for decades, 8 and both the judiciary and the legislatures of
the various states have been effective in ameliorating the harshness of
v. County of Yuma, 369 P.2d 271 (Ariz. 1962); Henderson v. Twin Falls County, 50 P.2d
597 (Idaho 1935); Wittmer v. Letts, 80 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1957). See generally Annot., 16
A.L.R.2d 1083 (1951).
26 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57, 73 S. Ct. 956, 979, 97 L. Ed. 1427, 1452
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
27 Suwannee County Hosp. Corp. v. Golden, 56 So. 2d 911, 913 (Fla. 1952).
28 Id. at 913.
29 In 1966, 92 per cent of all patients accepted by Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. were indigents. The hospital district "owns and operates a public hospital system for the purpose
of furnishing medical aid and hospital care to indigent and needy persons residing in the
hospital district." Arseneau v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 408 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80 Txx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4494n, § 14 (1960).
31 470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Sup. 1971).
32 "It is difficult, for example, to consider a person who pays $20 to $50 per day for a
hospital room to be the object of charity and entitled to no protection from negligent acts
of the hospital. Many forceful and persuasive opinions have been written to the effect that
" Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist
the entire doctrine is outmoded or should be modified ..
Church, 399 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Tex. Sup. 1966) (Greenhill, J., concurring). See also Villarreal
v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 443 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, no writ),
in which the court refused to apply the doctrine of charitable immunity to a paying patient in a hospital operated by a charitable organization.
83 An early contributor who is frequently cited is Professor Edwin Borchard of the
Yale Law School. See Borchard, Governmental Liability in Torts, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229
(1924), Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1927), Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1928), State and Municipal Liability in
Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform, 20 A.B.A.J. 747 (1934).
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its application.8 4 Texas has made significant strides in this general
direction by passing a tort claims act;8 5 yet the general rule of governmental immunity remains a fact. 6
The Ritch decision is incongruous with modern principles of equity.
To bar recovery for the negligent acts of hospital employees, especially
when the claimant is a "paying patient," is to deny the reasoning which
supported the abolishment of charitable immunity in Texas.8 Furthermore, the denial of claims like that of Mrs. Ritch and her children seems
to violate those ideals which fostered a tort claims act for this state."8
Ultimately, and most importantly, the Ritch decision defies the basic
responsibility of providing a remedy for every wrong. When the issues
of Ritch are again confronted in this state, our courts would do well to
consider the remarks of Justice Struckmeyer of the Supreme Court of
Arizona:
Reason suggests that a patient who pays for professional services
ought to be entitled to the same protection and the same redress
for wrongs as if the negligence had occurred in a privately owned
and operated hospital ....

If the government is to enter into busi-

ness ordinarily reserved to the field of private enterprise, it should
be held to the same responsibilities and liabilities. 89
Larry R. Patton
34 See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F.
919.
88 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970). The plaintiffs in Ritch did not raise
the question of the applicability of the Texas Tort Claims Act. The Supreme Court of
Texas, in a per curiam opinion, 480 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Sup. 1972), stated that as the question of the Texas Tort Claims Act was not before the court, they approved the lower
court's judgment, "without deciding whether or not the Tort Claims Act would remove
the bar of governmental immunity in the particular fact situation."
86 Tax. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 § 3 (1970), provides a statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity for personal injuries or death caused by "the operation or use of a
motor-driven vehicle and motor-driven equipment . . . or death or personal injuries so
caused from some condition or use of tangible property, real or personal ..
" If the
statute is interpreted literally, no cause of action accrues for the negligent acts of agents
or employees of government hospitals. Furthermore, the waiver of immunity for injuries
proximately caused by the operation or use of "motor-driven equipment," may not be
construed so as to include medical equipment. Id. § 18(a).
37 See Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Tex. Sup. 1966)
(Greenhill, J., concurring).
38 See Greenhill, Should Governmental Immunity for Torts Be Re-examined, and, If So,
By Whom?, 31 TEx. B.J. 1036 (1968).
89 Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 369 P.2d 271, 272 (Ariz. 1962).
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